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ABSTRACT. The impact of new institutionalism on the study of human environment interactions has been
meaningful. Institutional perspectives have further shaped and modified the field problems of common
pool resources, environmental hazards, and risk and environmental management. Given the relative
potential of institutional theories to increase the comprehension of the various dimensions of human–
environmental interactions, it has become increasingly important to attempt to consolidate different
interpretations of what institutions are, and how they mediate and constrain possibilities for more successful
environmental outcomes. This article focuses primarily on contending ontological perspectives on
institutions and institutional change. It argues that what should guide the application of institutional theories
in practical research regarding environmental change is the ontological dimension, and that the focus of
research should be on uncovering the underlying dynamics of institutional change. In doing so, it calls for
a methodological pluralism in the investigation of the role institutions play in driving/managing for
environmental change.
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INTRODUCTION
Multiple social science perspectives have produced
knowledge on human–environment interactions
and on processes of human-induced environmental
change. These different analytical frameworks
provide a “balance in research and policy on
environmental issues” that would not otherwise be
achieved (Adger et al. 2005). The institutional
perspective, for example, experienced a renaissance
in the last decades of the 20th century in a variety of
social disciplines (Hall and Taylor 1996). The
resurgence of interest in institutions developed, in
part, as a reaction to the behavioral movement,
which interpreted collective political and economic
behavior as the aggregate consequence of individual
choice (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Institutionalism,
by contrast, is a theoretical strategy that emphasizes
institutional theories and seeks to develop and apply
them (Jepperson 1991). Institutional theories weigh
institutional effects highly relative to other effects,
or isolate institutional-caused features of an
analytical object. Institutionalism suggests that
social systems vary in the extent to which action is
attributable to actors, operating in private capacities,
rather than conducted by authorized collective
agents of one sort or another (Hall and Taylor 1996).
Institutionalism has tended to “defocalize actors”
(Jepperson 1991:158).
The interdisciplinary field of environmental social
science has been much influenced by the
institutional wave of scientific analysis (Berkhout
et al. 2003, Paavola and Adger 2005). In the
common-pool resource literature, for example,
institutional perspectives highlighted the importance
of resources and property institutions in mediating
environmental outcomes (Bromley 1992, Baland
and Platteau 1996, Dietz et al. 2003). Lessons from
local and global common-pool resources
exemplified the influence of different property
rights regimes in providing appropriate incentives
for the successful management of fishing grounds,
forests, the global atmosphere, groundwater, and
other types of resources (Blomquist 1994, Ostrom
et al. 1999, Dolsak and Ostrom 2003). In the hazards
and development fields, institutional perspectives
shed light on the types of social and economic
interactions that drive patterns of human
vulnerability to environmental uncertainty and risk
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(Bohle et al. 1994, Scoones et al. 1996, Ribot et al.
1996). The perception that social institutions play a
fundamental role in defining the “social space of
vulnerability” (Watts and Bohle 1993:54),
contributed to the establishment of a human ecology
perspective on studies related to environmental
hazards (Hewitt 1997). Institutionalism also
promoted the necessary theoretical framework for
the conceptualization of livelihood security and
diversity in studies of economic and social
development of poorer households (Ellis 2000,
Haan and Zoomers 2005).
Given the relative potential of institutional theories
to increase our comprehension over the various
dimensions of human–environmental interactions,
it has become increasingly important to attempt to
consolidate different interpretations of what
institutions are, and how they influence social and
environmental outcomes. O’Riordan and Jordan
(1999) made such an attempt when reviewing the
status of new institutionalism and its importance in
the interpretation and resolution of climate change.
Johnson (2004) also described the application of
institutional theories by scholars of environmental
conservation and conflict. His focus was on
differing epistemological and methodological
approaches by those who favor what he calls a
sociological–historical approach and a “mainstream
common property approach” based on positivist
social science and methodological individualism.
This article focuses primarily on contending
ontological perspectives on institutions and
institutional change. It argues that what should
guide the application of institutional theories in
practical research regarding environmental change
is the ontological dimension, and that the focus of
research should be on uncovering the underlying
dynamics of institutional change. In doing so, it calls
for a methodological pluralism in the investigation
of the role institutions play in driving or managing
for environmental change. First, we present the
differing ontological perspectives on institutional
change. Then, we discuss how the institutional
perspective may be better applied for the study of
environmental change. Finally, we suggest future
research directions.
ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
In sociology, the core denotation of institution is
“an organized, established, procedure” (Jepperson
1991:143). In this context, an institution represents
a social order or pattern (i.e., standardized
interaction sequences) that has attained a certain
state or property. Institutionalization denotes the
process of such attainment. In economics,
institutions are interpreted as formal rules (e.g.,
judicial, political, economic rules and contracts) and
informal constraints (North 1990). In the economic
sense, institutions provide structure for exchange,
lowering uncertainties and establishing transaction
and transformation costs. They help determine the
opportunities in a society by established “rules of
the game” (Ostrom et al. 1994, Goodin 2000).
Sociology offers a broader interpretation of
institutions, as variously “production systems,
enabling structures, social programs or performance
scripts” (Jepperson 1991:145). In the sociological
sense, institutions are not just constraints, but they
simultaneously empower and control social agents
(Sewell 1992). Social structures are reproduced by
agents considered knowledgeable in everyday life
and the reciprocal reference of their actions to
shared typifications in society (Reich 2000). In this
way, institutions become the “more enduring
features of social life” (Giddens 1984:24).
The new institutionalism in economics stresses the
role of strategic interaction in the determination of
social outcomes by focusing largely on property
rights, rent-seeking, and transaction costs (Hall and
Taylor 1996). The theory postulates that an actor’s
behavior is likely to be driven, not by impersonal
historical forces, but by a strategic calculus and,
second, that this calculus will be deeply affected by
the actor’s expectations about how others are likely
to behave as well. Institutions structure interactions
by either affecting the range of available alternatives
or by providing information and enforcement
processes that reduce uncertainty about the
corresponding behavior of others, thus allowing
gains from exchange (Ostrom et al. 1999, Goodin
2000). Institutional arrangements are viewed as
“adaptive solutions to problems of opportunism,
imperfect or asymmetric information and costly
monitoring” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991:9).
For new institutional economics, institutions arise
and persist when they confer benefits greater than
the transaction costs incurred in creating and
sustaining them (North 1990, Ostrom 1990).
Previously existing institutions, that is, formal laws
and regulations, informal laws and ideologies,
constrain the range of institutional alternatives. In
this way, the extent to which new institutions differ
Ecology and Society 11(1): 41
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art41/
from old ones is limited, mitigating against more
radical and abrupt institutional change (North
1990). A similar reasoning to the causes of
institutional change is offered by political scientists
attesting to functionalist arguments (Pierson 2000).
The basic functionalist assumption is that
institutions exist in the form they do because they
are functional for social actors, in particular, for
their role in solving collective action problems and
allowing actors to “achieve joint gains through
cooperation and exchange” (Thelen 2003:214).
Institutional genesis is explained by the efforts of
rational choice actors to design appropriate
institutions to fulfill certain functions, as an act of
“crafting institutions” (Ostrom 1992). This could
result either in incremental or abrupt change (i.e.,
institutional transformation) as a shift in
environmental or other conditions render the
existing institutions dysfunctional (Thelen 2003).
Institutional reproduction is explained specifically
because of its functional consequences (i.e.,
integration, adaptation, survival) for a larger system
within which the institution is embedded.
Institutional sociology adds to the explanation of
institutional persistence (stickiness) and change
arguments in favor of shared cultural understandings,
and the importance of power and legitimacy in
understanding processes that hamper and promote
change (Thelen 1999). Social constructionist views
hold that actors suffer from limited information and
high levels of uncertainty and thus are more driven
by concerns for doing what is institutionally
acceptable and culturally appropriate than by some
kind of cost–benefit analysis (Powell and DiMaggio
1991). The market, is seen not only as an allocative
mechanism but also “an institutionally specific
cultural system for generating and measuring value”
(Friedland and Alford 1991:234). Social actors
construct new institutions by extending already
existing institutional principles, conventions, and
concepts to new realms of activity. In this way,
institutions provide actors with social scripts that
enable them in ways that contribute to the
evolutionary nature of institutional change
(Jepperson1991).
Social constructionists argue that individuals can
manipulate or reinterpret symbols and practices, and
thus, are “artful in the mobilization of different
institutional logics to serve their purposes”
(Friedland and Alford 1991:254). Sometimes rules
and symbols are internalized and result in almost
universal conformity, but sometimes they are
resources manipulated by individuals, groups, and
organizations. Moreover, the success of an attempt
at institutional change depends not only on the
resources controlled by its proponents, but on the
nature of power and the institutionally specific rules
by which resources are allocated, produced, and
controlled. In the words of Friedland and Alford
(1991:254), “the institutional nature of power
provides specific opportunities for not only
reproduction, but transformation as well.” By
stressing the role of power in explaining
institutional change, social institutionalists emphasise
“isomorphism instead of coordination effects” as
the main mechanism of institutional reproduction
(Thelen 1999:387).
Like utilitarian analysts, power explanations of self-
reinforcing processes may also assume that actors
make decisions by weighing costs and benefits, but
that institutions distribute these costs and benefits
unevenly. In a power-centered approach, an
institution can persist even when most individuals
or groups prefer to change it, given that an elite that
benefits from the existing arrangement has
sufficient strength to promote its reproduction
(Thelen 2003). In this way, self-reinforcing
processes are explained by an outgrowth of pre-
existing power arrangements where institutions
gradually increase the power of the advantaged
group to the detriment of other groups (Mahoney
2000). Institutional transformation becomes
possible when the inherent conflict between the
different societal groups reaches a critical threshold
point, where subordinate groups successfully
challenge the prevailing arrangements.
Different from power arguments, legitimation is
grounded in actors’ subjective orientations and
beliefs about what is considered appropriate or
morally correct (Thelen 2003). Institutional
reproduction occurs because, as actors view
institutions as being appropriate or legitimate, this
forms a basis for making future decisions about what
is appropriate by a positive feedback process of
increasing legitimation. Beliefs in the legitimacy of
an institution may range from “active moral
approval to passive acquiescence in the face of the
status quo” (Mahoney 2000:523). Institutional
transformation may come about by arising
inconsistencies between multiple cognitive frameworks
that are predominant in society, providing a basis
for actors to adopt new subjective evaluations and
moral codes concerning appropriateness.
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The utilitarian/functionalist, power-distribution,
and legitimacy accounts specify various processes
of genesis and reproduction that may be sustaining
different institutional arrangements through time
(Table 1). Institutional theories (i.e., historical
institutionalism) also recognize the importance of
path dependency and contingency in determining
social outcomes (Steinmo et al. 1992, Hall and
Taylor 1996, Greif 1998). Contemporary arguments
on path dependence emphasize moments of
institutional innovation in which agency, choice,
and contingency figure prominently. Such moments
are then followed by institutional reproduction
where the importance of strategy and choice recede
relative to processes of adaptations to institutional
incentives and constraints (Thelen 2003).
Contingency referes to “the inability of theory to
predict or explain, either deterministically or
probabilistically, the occurrence of a specific
outcome” (Mahoney 2000:513).
This treatment of institutional change largely attests
to the notion that the factors responsible for the
genesis of an institution may not be the same as
those that sustain it over time (Stinchcombe 1968).
In other words, much of the analysis tends to
encourage a strict separation of the issues of
institutional innovation and institutional reproduction.
Such a perspective sees institutions as the products
of specific historical episodes (e.g., critical
junctures and breakpoints) that result in
configurations that then set constraints on
subsequent development. Formal institutions will
often “neither accurately reflect the congealed tastes
of their creators, nor simply mirror the present
prevailing power distribution” (Thelen 2003:230;
italics given by the author). These conceptualizations
of institutional change offer an opportunity for a
more nuanced analysis of when and how particular
aspects may be more amenable to change than
others. It also draws attention to the ways in which
adaptation to other ongoing processes (and not just
the positive feedbacks generated by the process
itself) contributes to institutional continuities over
long periods of time. Thus, institutions evolve in
ways that—even if not predictable ex ante—
nonetheless, follow a particular logic that makes
sense only against the backdrop of the institutional
context in which the next steps are constantly being
renegotiated under the notion of “bounded change”
(Weir 1992).
INSTITUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
The utilitarian/functionalist accounts rely mainly on
efficiency arguments regarding the institutional role
of facilitating actors to achieve joint gains through
cooperation and exchange. The primary features of
institutions as systems of rules and procedures
articulated in contracts, constitutions, and treaties
(i.e., constitutive documents), drive the decision-
making process. Academics will seek to design
arrangements that alter the structure of (dis)
incentives that actors face in order to produce
successful environmental outcomes: a process
termed “crafting” (see Ostrom 1992, Ostrom et al.
1994). In this way, a rational manipulation of pre-
existing institutional arrangements by social actors
becomes a real possibility (Rudd 2004).
Instrumental action, governed by pre-existing
technical rules, takes the forefront in pursuit of more
effective institutional arrangements. This “logic of
consequences” assumes that actors respond
accordingly to changes in costs and benefits
associated with available options that serve a
functional purpose (Young 2002). This approach is
firmly rooted in an epistemology that seeks to build
predictive theories about the robustness of common
property regimes based on a hypothetico-deductive
search for falsifiable claims about processes of
environmental change.
In contrast, power-distribution/legitimacy accounts
stress the importance of de facto (rules-in-use)
arrangements for governing decisions rather than de
jure (rules-on-paper) arrangements sometimes
defined as “dead letters” (Young 2002:6). This
“logic of appropriateness” assumes that actors
behave in ways that they deem as right or proper,
and that they will normally accept restrictions that
they perceive to be legitimate. Behavior is generally
“guided by underlying principles interpreted as fair
or just” (Young 2002:18). Academics who favor
this logic contextualize environmental challenges
in historical, political, cultural, and biogeographical
frames (McCay 2002). This requires a greater
attention to the “embeddedness of individual and
social action, and the historical, political,
sociocultural, and ecological specificity of human–
environment interactions and institutions” (McCay
2002:362). Patterns of environmental change are
translated into outcomes of negotiation, or
contestation, between social actors with different
interests and legitimizing systems of social norms
and customary rights. Institutions, in this sense, co-
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Table 1. Typology of possible explanations for institutional change
Utilitarian explanation Functional explanation Power explanation Legitimation explanation
Mechanism of
genesis
Institution is established to
minimize transaction costs
Institution is crafted in
order to overcome
collective action
problems
Institution is
established out of
political conflict and
strategic bargaining
Institution is
constructed based on a
social definition of
reality
Mechanism of
reproduction
Institution is reproduced
through the rational cost–
benefit assessments of
actors
Institution is reproduced
because it serves a
function for an overall
system
Institution is
reproduced because it
is supported by an
elite group of actors
Institution is
reproduced because
actors believe it is
morally just or
appropriate
Mechanism of
transformation
Increased competitive
pressures; learning
processes
Exogenous shock that
transforms system needs
Weakening of elites
and strengthening of
subordinate groups
Changes in the values
or subjective beliefs
of actors
Adapted from Mahoney (2000).
evolve by incorporating rituals and informal
ecological knowledge encoded in cultural practices
of daily life (Berkes and Farvar 1989, Norgaard
1994, Berkes and Folke 1998).
Johnson (2004:428) describes these two contending
epistemological applications as tensions that exist
because of a “divergence between a social science
which seeks to build theory on the basis of scientific
empiricism and an ethnography which rejects the
universalism that underlies the scientific approach.”
The author continues to assert that “the problem this
creates for the study of social phenomena (such as
common property relations) is that proponents of
context and ethnographic method and those
favouring a scientific frame are left with little
common ground to stand on.” we argue that what
could break this impasse is a switch from
epistemology to ontology as a point of departure in
the investigation of institutions and environmental
change. Ontological considerations on what
properties and dimensions social institutions
possess should guide methodology and practical
research. Moreover, institutions as either
predominantly based on incentive structures or
cultural/behavioral and distributive frames should
not be regarded as exclusive, but complementary
views in the investigation of environmental change.
Rights and relationships governing who has access
and control over resources tend to change over time.
These are driven by both rights-based considerations
and specific political–economic and cultural frames
within which access to resources is sought (Ribot
and Peluso 2003). Conflicts over the management
of common-pool resources depend not only on
material interests, but also on belief systems, power
relations, and common frames of reference. Adams
et al. (2005:1915) assert that policy debates over
common-pool dilemmas tend to “ignore the fact that
the assumptions, knowledge, and understandings
that underlie the definition of resource problems are
frequently uncertain and contested.” In Zimbabwe,
for example, the embedded nature of bureaucratic
attitudes and practices, shaped by science, provided
the basis for the persistence of a technocratic style
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of state response to environmental and land
management issues (Keeley and Scoones 2003).
Collective environmental decisions often reflect a
balance between socially acknowledged and
supported claims or rights, and ideological and
discursive manipulations, as well as relations of
production and exchange, that differentiate access
properties to environmental resources. Downing
and Baker (2000) found evidence in rural Botswana
that official discourses proclaiming the severity of
drought events legitimized the processes that were
increasing dependency of more vulnerable groups
on rural elites, who saw an opportunity for the
consolidation of wealth with the commoditization
of agriculture and privatization of production. In
Indonesia, the effectiveness of local forest
conservation units was severely hampered by policy
narratives that prioritized aquaculture intensification
to the detriment of mangrove conservation,
reflecting the interests of more powerful social
groups (Armitage 2002). Paavola and Adger
(2005:365) mention that the institutional approach
“suggests that more attention ought to be given to
processes and procedures in environmental decision
making in order to guarantee adequate learning and
fair representation of affected parties and legitimacy
of environmental decisions.” Broader interpretations
of what institutions are, and their role in driving
social–ecological outcomes would, at least, shed
light on environmental governance goals held by a
wider audience of decision makers and
stakeholders.
Another key development for the use of institutional
theories to investigate environmental change would
be a switch from an ontology based on “static”
institutions to generative processes of institutional
change as primary objects of study. This would
facilitate the task of uncovering causal relationships
between social institutions and environmental
outcomes (Stern et al. 2002). Social institutions rest
on multiple foundations (i.e., belief systems, power
arrangements, functional properties, etc.), and thus
the process of institutional dynamics may be best
described as interplay between these different
foundations. Different processes of institutional
change, such as those delineated in Table 1, may
either be self-reinforcing or transformative, or they
may cause institutional breakdown at a given
moment in time. Legitimizing accounts, for
example, can influence the effectiveness of
utilitarian and functional processes, and even make
them unsuitable for governing resource use. The
padu system of community-based fisheries
management in South India arose out of local
contestations of the state-sanctioned property rights
regime for shrimp exploitation (Lobe and Berkes
2004). Local groups organized themselves in order
to present their collective claim to a stake of the net
fishery based on their traditional caste-based right,
instead of obeying the licensing arrangements
promoted by the centralized government.
Distributional effects of newly established
institutional arrangements may also hamper the
success of utilitarian-based environmental regimes.
In Vietnam, for example, increased social inequality
in resource-dependent coastal communities, caused
by the ascendancy of private property ownership in
mangrove areas, led to a breakdown in collective
action arrangements previously established to
manage such resources (Adger 2000).
The research problem becomes one of investigating
how (when and by whom) the partial renegotiation
and redirection of (which) elements of a given set
of institutions take place to minimize environmental
deterioration and social vulnerability. Of particular
interest are transformative processes that modify
pre-existing structures of environmental governance
in order to minimize situations of risk—the risk of
losing access to those resources that safeguard
livelihood security and human well-being. Berkes
et al. (2003:11) assert that “adaptive capacity of all
levels of society is constrained by the resilience of
their institutions and the natural systems on which
they depend. The greater their resilience, the greater
is their ability to absorb shocks and perturbations
and adapt to change. Conversely, the less resilient
the system, the greater is the vulnerability of
institutions and societies to cope and adapt to
change.” In fact, Adger (2003:33) argues that
“adaptive capacity is only potential until there are
governance institutions that make it realizable.” A
more directed research focus toward transformative
processes could aid the understanding of how
creative opportunities for institutional adaptation
emerge in order to better address environmental
challenges facing sensitive geographical regions
(see, e.g., Olsson et al. (2004)).
It is essential that the research problem just
described be grounded on the basis of
metatheoretical considerations regarding institutional
change, by the application of an appropriate
ontological–methodological link. The decisive
question should be how different methodologies can
be best applied in order to convey knowledge about
the generative processes of institutional change.
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Complementary empirical procedures should be
viewed as being part of a greater whole, namely the
research process guided by a critical ontology. This
methodological pluralism should allow for the
investigation of acting people and social institutions
in the context of environmental change as two
separate entities—both with properties and powers
of their own. As Dietz et al. (2003:1907) claim:
“People bring varying perspectives, interests, and
fundamental philosophies to problems of
environmental governance, and their conflicts, if
they do not escalate to the point of dysfunction, can
spark learning and change.”
CONCLUSIONS
The application of institutional perspectives to the
study of human–environmental interactions will
undoubtedly grow in importance in the future (see
Adger et al. 2005). In order to channel research
efforts into more productive venues, we would
argue that, first, differing ontological perspectives
of what institutions are should not be discarded
when research questions are framed. Second, a
nuanced analysis of the interplay between different
processes of institutional innovation, reproduction,
and transformation is critical for a better
understanding of institutional forces as drivers of
environmental change. Of particular interest, are the
transformative aspects of institutions already set to
govern resource access and use. Finally, we would
argue that, due to increasing rates of environmental
change (Folke et al. 2002) caused by climate change
(McCarthy et al. 2001) and other factors (Dietz et
al. 2003), the goal of institutional research applied
to human–environmental interactions should be to
advance our knowledge about how generative
processes of institutional change shape and modify
social institutions to safeguard a sound level of
reflexivity and flexibility. In this way, institutional
resilience may be enhanced and society may
become better able to generate novel solutions or
policies for chronic resource issues.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art41/responses/
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